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In the wake of World War I, geographers helped advise national delegations at the 1919 Paris 
Peace Conference whose purpose was to delimit Europe’s new boundaries. The paper 
examines the role played by British geographers, specifically Alan Ogilvie and the British 
geographical delegation, in the Treaty of Trianon (1920) which greatly reduced Hungary’s 
territorial extent. Attention is paid to contemporary published work on the new Europe, 
particularly Marion Newbigin’s Aftermath: A Geographical Study of the Peace Terms and 
Ogilvie’s Boundary Settlement (1922). Assessment of manuscript diaries and correspondence 
reveals the complex circumstances faced by geographers engaged in peace work. The work of 
different practitioners – in the Royal Geographical Society (RGS), over how national 
boundaries should be arrived at (on either ethnic or physiographic grounds) – was hindered 
by inadequate map provision from British geographical institutions. This led Ogilvie to 
propose a new geographical body for Britain at a time when the RGS was facing criticism 
and when the meetings of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, not the 














None of the Peace Treaties was more drastic in its terms than the Treaty of Trianon. By it 
Hungary was not so much mutilated as dismembered. (Macartney, 1937, p. 1) 
 
Following World War I, politicians from combatant nations faced the challenge of re-writing 
Europe’s national borders. Geographical representatives who acted as members of or advisors 
to different national delegations helped delimit the new boundaries that followed the peace 
treaties. American, British, and continental European geographers’ participation in World 
War II has been the subject of analysis (Ackerman, 1945; Balchin, 1987; Maddrell, 2008; 
Clayton and Barnes, 2015). Almost no work has examined the role played by British 
geographers in WWI.  
     Heffernan (1996) is an important exception. Even before 1914, notes Heffernan, the Royal 
Geographical Society (RGS) was involved with the Ordnance Survey (OS) and the 
Geographical Section of the General Staff (GSGS) in coordinating geographical facts for use 
in military strategy, in boundary mapping, and in collaborating on the 1:1 million map project 
initiated in 1891 by German geomorphologist Albrecht Penck. As early as mid-1914, the 
RGS became, in effect, ‘a technical and cartographic annex to the War Office’ (Heffernan, 
1996, p. 509). Individuals involved in this respect included imperial surveyor Colonel Sir 
Thomas Holdich, Colonel (later Sir) Walter Coote Hedley of the GSGS, and astronomer 
Arthur Hinks, who, from 1915, combined the roles of RGS secretary and editor of the 
society’s Geographical Journal. From 1914, these individuals and institutions were 
principally concerned with the 1:1 million mapping of the Near East and North Africa. From 
1916, their attention focused on mapping and military strategy on Europe’s western front. At 
the end of the war, British geographical representation in Paris for the peace negotiations 
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comprised a small GSGS party, led by Hedley ‘and including Major O E Wynne and Captain 
Alan G Ogilvie, who offered cartographic advice to the British delegation’ (Heffernan, 1996, 
p. 520). The British geographical delegation was neither as large nor as influential as that of 
other nations’. For Heffernan, ‘The failure of British geographers to play a significant role in 
the Peace Conference possibly relates to the largely amateur nature of the discipline in the 
UK at the time’ (Heffernan, 1996, p. 521). 
     This paper, like that of Heffernan (1996), is a foray into ‘the dialectic between geography 
and war in the period from 1914 to 1919’ (Heffernan, 1996, p. 505). Unlike Heffernan, whose 
focus was British geography and geographers at work in WWI, our concern is with the role of 
British geography and geographers in negotiating the peace that followed the conflict and 
with their reactions to a specific treaty, the Treaty of Trianon of 4 June 1920, that re-drew the 
boundaries of one combatant nation, Hungary.  
     The facts of Trianon are well known. In a document of 364 articles in 14 parts, Hungary 
ceded approximately two-thirds of its territory, and 60% of its population (from 18.2 million 
to 7.9 million) to six different neighbouring states (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Romania, Yugoslavia, and Italy). Hungary’s territorial losses far exceeded those of Germany, 
commonly considered the primary defeated nation. Hungary’s ‘dismemberment’ at Trianon – 
a term used widely to describe the event – was of enormous concern to contemporaries and 
has defined Hungary since: ‘the catastrophe that befell Hungary at the Paris Peace 
Conference was the most decisive moment in modern Hungarian history, the repercussions of 
which continue to be felt even today’ (Caples, 2005, p. 52). If the facts of Trianon are 
understood, British geography’s involvement in the treaty and in its aftermath is not. 
     The purpose of this paper is to examine British involvement in the Paris negotiations, 
Trianon’s aftermath, and the reaction, chiefly of British but also of Hungarian geographers, in 
print and in speech, to Hungary’s dismemberment. To do so, we trace the activities of British 
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geographers concerning Hungary, mapping and war before as well as after Trianon. The 
paper makes use of private diaries, unpublished correspondence, and published work, in 
English and in Hungarian, to explore the role of the key individuals and institutions involved, 
notably the RGS and the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS). 
Principal among the individuals involved was Alan Ogilvie, one of Britain’s geographical 
representatives in Paris, and, from 1923, lecturer, reader, and (from 1931) professor in 
geography at the University of Edinburgh. Others include Marion Newbigin, editor of the 
Scottish Geographical Magazine, and John McFarlane, author (amongst other works) of a 
text on economic geography (McFarlane, 1914). McFarlane, a historian by training, was from 
1903 lecturer in geography at the University of Manchester before, in 1919, he took up the 
first lectureship in geography at the University of Aberdeen. During WWI, he was involved 
with Hinks and other British geographers, including Henry N. Dickson and R. N. Rudmose 
Brown, in preparing naval and military handbooks for use in the conflict (Naval Intelligence 
Department, 1919; Kain and Delano-Smith, 2003, pp. 388–89). Ogilvie filled McFarlane’s 
Manchester post between August 1919 and May 1920. In June 1920, Ogilvie departed for the 
American Geographical Society (AGS) in New York to work on the 1:1 million map project 
alongside Isaiah Bowman – who led the American geographical group in Paris.  
     The first part of the paper provides necessary context to our later detailed analysis. We 
document the work of the geographical delegations in Paris, the involvement of the 
Hungarian delegation in the Treaty of Trianon and discuss the appeals made, by Hungarian 
geographers and others, for ‘Justice for Hungary’. In the second part, we begin our analysis 
of British geographers’ involvement with Trianon and its aftermath by examining the two 
principal printed works on the question, Marion Newbigin’s Aftermath: A Geographical 
Study of the Peace Terms (1920), and Alan Ogilvie’s Some Aspects of Boundary Settlement at 
the Peace Conference (1922). At 128 pages, Newbigin’s Aftermath is the largest single work 
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by a contemporary British geographer into the immediate circumstances of Europe post-
WWI, a fact that makes its omission by later scholars puzzling (none of Dhand (2018), Smith 
(2003) or Seegel (2018) mention it or her). Ogilvie’s shorter 1922 Boundary Settlement has 
also been ignored despite his central involvement, in Paris and among Britain’s geographers, 
in the work of boundary delimitation.  
     In the third part, we discuss British geographers’ interests in Hungary before Trianon. We 
examine the activities of the British delegation in Paris with specific reference to Ogilvie’s 
work, his prior experience of boundary mapping and his work with Cambridge historian 
Harold Temperley, a member of the British delegation, who produced a definitive account of 
the Paris Conference (Temperley, 1920) and who invited Ogilvie to prepare his 1922 book. 
Ogilvie’s proposal, never realised, for a new British geographical organisation in this context 
was, we suggest, affirmation of the muddled state of British geography, in map work and in 
its relationship with British government departments, and of competing ideas as to how 
boundary mapping should be undertaken. In the final part, we return to spoken papers and 
published work by Newbigin, McFarlane and others to show why section E of the BAAS, and 
not the RGS, provided the setting for British geographers’ engagement with Trianon and 
Hungary after 1920.  
     This narrative structure warrants explanation. To begin with the principal published works 
which appear at the end of the period in question is not to flout the ‘rules’ of chronological 
order in historical narrative. Our concern is to document what British geographers said and 
wrote about the geographical consequences of Trianon in relation to WWI and the new 
Europe. To do this and to understand not just what was said and when but how, why, and by 
whom requires that we get ‘behind and beneath’ published accounts and illuminate the 
complex circumstances involved: in earlier years, in different institutional settings, in private 
correspondence and public utterances as well as in print. Rather, then, than work forwards to 
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what might be taken as the printed apotheoses of British geographical interests in the new 
Europe immediately after WWI, we work back and forth between c.1915 and c.1922 and 
between published work and manuscript evidence in order to illuminate the connections 
between geographers’ work and geographers’ lives.      
   
Geographers in Paris: the Peace Conference, Trianon, and ‘justice for Hungary’ 
 
The Paris Peace Conference began on 1 January 1919: it and its ramifications have been 
widely studied (for a summary, see Macmillan, 2001; for a detailed history, see Temperley, 
1920; for a comprehensive history of the Trianon Treaty, see Romsics, 2002). Others have 
described the role played by geographers advising these delegations, notably Isaiah Bowman 
and his colleagues on behalf of the United States (Smith, 2003, pp. 139–80; Reisser, 2012; 
Martin, 2015, pp. 52, 640), and, less fully, of Eugeniusz Romer and Jovan Cvijić for east 
central Europe (Seegel, 2018, pp. 44–7, 58; Konopska, 2016; Labbé, 2018; Ginsburger, 
2016). Several studies have been published on the role of Hungarian geographers by 
Hungarian authors (Hajdú, 2000; Krasznai, 2012; Segyevy, 2016), chief among them 
Ablonczy’s biographical monograph on Pál Teleki (Ablonczy, 2007). Documenting the 
delegations’ work at length is not our concern, except where it is relevant for Ogilvie and 
Briain’s geographical contingent. Some background facts are important nevertheless. 
 
Geographers Working for Peace 
Geographers were involved in delegations from the victorious nations, including Britain, 
France, and the United States, and from those ‘emergent’ nations whose territorial 
delimitation was among the subjects for discussion. The French delegation took its 
geographical information from representatives of the Geographical Section of the French 
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Foreign Office; the Service Géographique de l’Armée; and the Service Géographique 
Français, drawn from the Société de Géographie de Paris, which included geographers 
Emmanuel de Martonne, Emmanuel de Margerie, Albert Demangeon, Lucien Gallois, and 
Jean Brunhes. France’s geographical representatives helped wield ‘real influence on French 
policies at the Peace Conference’ (Heffernan, 1996, p. 520; see also Heffernan, 1995).  
     The American peace delegation was a large-scale affair (over 150 academics, 1,248 
persons in all: Smith, 2003, p. 145). Nominally under the direction of Colonel Edward 
Mandell House, appointed to the position by US President Woodrow Wilson, it was managed 
by Isaiah Bowman, director of the AGS in whose New York offices the House Inquiry was 
housed. Bowman, the ‘chief territorial specialist to the American delegation’ (Smith, 2003, p. 
143), was one of four geographers advising the Americans. The others were Douglas Johnson 
from Columbia University, Mark Jefferson from Michigan State Normal School, and, briefly, 
Lawrence Martin of the University of Wisconsin. Jefferson headed the division on 
“geography and cartography”, Johnson that of “boundary topography”. The work of human 
geographer Jovan Cvijić from the University of Belgrade on mapping ethnic boundaries 
helped unite the Serbs, Croatians, and Slovenians into what became Yugoslavia (Ginsburger, 
2016). Cartographer and political geographer Eugeniusz Romer acted similarly in advising 
the Polish delegation (Seegel, 2018; Konopska, 2016; Labbé, 2018). The three-man British 
‘geographical section’ – Hedley, Wynne, and, until June 1919, Ogilvie – ‘was able to furnish 
the delegation and the Congress in general with an ample supply of maps, in which it had the 
help of a cartographic section R. E. [Royal Engineers] with printing equipment commanded 
by Major W. Stanford’ (Anon., 1920, p. 312: although unattributed, the author was Hinks).  
     Many of the geographers engaged in peace work in Paris knew one another. They did so 
because they had participated in the 1912 Transcontinental Excursion of the United States 
under the direction of geomorphologist William Morris Davis. This is the case for Bowman, 
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Johnson and Jefferson from the United States, for Demangeon, Gallois, de Martonne, and de 
Margerie from France, and Ogilvie from Britain. Two leading Hungarian geographers who 
headed the Hungarian peace preparation work, Pál Teleki (who was among the Hungarian 
negotiators in Paris in 1920) and Jenő Cholnoky (who was the head of the Peace Preparation 
Office in Budapest while Teleki was in Paris), also took part in the Excursion. Cholnoky 
published his recollections of the excursion decades later (Cholnoky, 1942). The work in 
Paris within and between national delegations thus drew upon prior social relationships 
sustained by shared experiences of an eight-week 14,000-mile geographical fieldtrip (Clout, 
2005; Maclean, 2011). For Ogilvie and Johnston in particular, proximity in Paris 
strengthened these personal connections. The British delegation billeted in the Hôtel 
Majestic, the Americans’ in the Hôtel de Crillon. Ogilvie, Johnson, and others socialised 
together: making peace was several times the subject of dinner table conversation.  
     The work of these geographers involved preparing and drawing maps, and in advising 
delegations upon the placement of boundaries and upon the possible consequences. The work 
of mapping was principally based on ethnic distribution determined by language use, not 
physiography or other ‘natural’ features (an emphasis which would prove awkward for some 
British geographers). On a continental scale, the focus upon ‘the cartography of ethnicity’ 
(Smith, 2003, p. 174) summarily changed the identities of tens of millions of people in 
Europe and, in doing so, helped sow the seeds of later greater conflict (Smith, 2003: Seegel, 
2018). Locally, delegates’ recognition of the epistemic value of maps depended upon 
networks of individual contact and information exchange: among individual geographers 
advising different national delegations, and between individual geographers in Paris and their 
host geographical societies. For Ogilvie, these networks were also personal, involving his 
wife Evelyn (like Ogilvie an Oxford-educated geographer), who received official clearance 
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from Military Intelligence (MI4) in GSGS and who acted as an unpaid research assistant, 
liaising between Hinks, Holdich, and others in the RGS, and her husband in Paris.            
     These issues – of socio-intellectual context before 1919 and in Paris, particular spaces 
affording Conference participants a means to extend such contact, and emphasis upon 
mapping ethnicity – applied to the Hungarian delegation, but in different ways. The 
Hungarian delegation, led by Count Albert Apponyi and including Teleki, had no role in the 
peace negotiations until 1 December 1919 (formally, they accepted the invitation to take part 
on 3 December) and, effectively, no official involvement until late January 1920 by which 
time Hungary’s new borders under Trianon had been drawn up. It is worth noting, however, 
that Teleki and the Hungarian politicians were realistic about the imminent territorial losses 
even before the peace talks had started, as is evident from the letter Teleki sent to Bowman 
(Teleki, 1918, December 25). The first ‘concrete and recorded plan for the new frontiers of 
Hungary’ came in a report of January 1919 prepared by the division chiefs of the Intelligence 
Section of the American delegation, to which section Isaiah Bowman was executive officer 
(Deák, 1942, p. 27). In later informing diplomatic historian Francis Deák about working 
procedures, Bowman provides a glimpse into what was involved. Memoranda on particular 
topics ‘were reduced to brief and undocumented recommendations.’ These, upon further 
review, ‘were assembled, illustrated with maps, and brought together in what was called the 
“Black Book”’ (Deák, 1942, p. 27). This “Black Book” – so-called because of its binding – 
was the United States’ (in effect, Bowman’s) proposals for the new Europe (Reisser, 2012; 
Smith, 2003, pp. 147–49). Base maps had been prepared by staff in the AGS before arrival in 
Paris (Anon., 1919: although unattributed, the author was Bowman). Map making and 
boundary delimitation was central to the geographers’ work because contemporaries saw 
maps as political instruments – ‘powerful tools toward specific, often highly political 




Justice for Hungary: Revisionism and the Reaction of Hungary’s Geographers 
It is helpful to distinguish between politicians’ reaction to Trianon, that of the Hungarian 
public, and the reaction of Hungary’s geographers, related though these topics are. Hungary 
was unstable politically following defeat in WWI. A Hungarian Peoples’ Republic operated 
between November 1918 and March 1919. This was followed by a short-lived Hungarian 
Soviet Republic (March–August 1919), which was suppressed with the help of the Romanian 
army. The Kingdom of Hungary was restored in March 1920: Admiral Horthy was elected 
‘Regent’ because the return of the Habsburgs to the Hungarian throne was banned by the 
Allies. Shared views over Hungary’s ‘dismemberment’, and appeals to a new ‘Mitteleuropa’ 
of small nations, with a reduced Hungary as part, were not aided by what Apponyi tersely 
described as ‘two revolutions, four months of the ragings of Bolshevism and several months 
of the Roumanian occupation’ (Deák, 1942, p. 546; Dhand, 2018, pp. 133–34, 141–43; 
Pastor, 2003).  
     In the public sphere, newspapers and popular iconography displayed common themes: 
dismay, lament at the destruction of a one-thousand-year old kingdom, appeals to 
international intervention (Peterecz, 2017). Popular cartography was used to justify 
revisionist claims (Keményfi, 2010). As part of an appeal in English for ‘Justice for 
Hungary’, one Hungarian newspaper published maps which showed the loss of Hungarian 
territory and, comparatively, the effect upon Great Britain had Trianon been applied there 
(Figure 1). The ‘Justice for Hungary’ campaign intensified in the late 1920s after Hungary 
had secured the support of Italy in 1927. The journal Magyar Szemle was the primary public 
forum for discussion of what became the two principal issues: revision of Trianon and a 
developing Hungarian irredentism, and concern over the situation of ethnic Hungarians 
resident in adjoining states (Caples, 2005). The range of the goals of territorial revision ran 
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from the minimal (the re-annexation of territory with indisputably Hungarian populations that 
lay outside the country’s new borders) to an integral revisionism (with the motto: ‘Everything 
Back!’). (For a detailed analysis of the ideas on revisionism, see Zeidler, 2007, pp. 65–79.) 
<Figure 1 about here: full page, portrait, colour> 
     Hungary’s geographical representatives thus arrived at the Peace Conference in particular 
circumstances: late, to join in proceedings whose proposals were already accepted and for 
which map boundaries were prepared, at least in draft, without the capacity to effect change, 
and as members of a nation large parts of whose geography had been summarily removed. 
Once there, they found that others did not view the Hungarian question as significant. 
Hungarians had long been seen as elite within Austro-Hungary: attitudes in Paris reflected 
views of them as cultural oppressors. Where delegates from the victorious nations were 
certainly war weary, they were by the time of Trianon also tired of peace making. Settlement 
with the Germans (the Treaty of Versailles) was for many the principal objective. This treaty 
played no part in the negotiations with Hungary. Together with long-running views on 
Magyar hegemony toward other ethnicities, it did, however, have ‘a decided bearing on the 
psychology of some of the Allied participants in the Peace Conference, who were primarily 
interested in Germany and who, after the peace with her had been made, exhibited only a 
perfunctory interest in the other peace treaties’ (Deák, 1942, p. 181). For others, Trianon was 
hurried through because it was late in the negotiations overall, ‘at a time when the 
peacemakers were anxious to bring the entire process to a swift conclusion’ (Caples, 2005, p. 
55): ‘what ultimately told against Hungary was sheer inertia’ (Macmillan, 2001, p. 277). 
     The Hungarians impressed nevertheless. For Deák, ‘the capacity shown by the Hungarians 
at the Peace Conference to support their contentions with voluminous material of no mean 
scientific value and a fair amount of accuracy was indeed remarkable. This accomplishment 
says much for the quality of the men who composed the Hungarian Peace Delegation and 
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indicates a self-sacrificing willingness to work and cooperate in the effort to salvage 
everything possible from the shambles left in the wake of war, revolution, and enemy 
occupation’ (Deák, 1942, p. 177). Apponyi’s statement, in which he voiced Hungarians’ 
‘astonishment at the extreme severity of the conditions of peace’, was a tour de force (Deák, 
1942, p. 540; Macmillan, 2001, p. 277). Teleki was praised: ‘His knowledge of geography, 
geopolitics, demography, and history was largely the foundation on which the work of the 
[Hungarian] Peace Delegation was based’ (Deák, 1942, pp. 178–79). Although Deák cannot 
be called an impartial historian of the negotiations – he worked as legal advisor to the 
Hungarian delegation at the assemblies of the League of Nations in the 1930s (Reeves, 2011, 
pp. 23–7) – the impact of the Hungarian argument is unquestionable. The Italian Prime 
Minister, Francesco Nitti, was genuinely moved by Apponyi’s speech, and even the reaction 
of Lloyd George seemed encouraging (Romsics, 2002, pp. 127–128).   
     Hungary’s geographers turned to map making, to publications urging Trianon’s revision, 
and appeals to the international geographical community. The key representatives of the 
Hungarian Geographical Society were confident about the positive outcome of the war and 
the successful accomplishment of their goals even as late as spring of 1918, but they 
feverishly switched to a new mode a few months later in order to produce arguments in 
defence of their national boundaries. The peace preparation work was initiated by the 
secretary general of the society, Pál Teleki, and, in collaboration with the Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office and the government, the Hungarian Geographical Society embarked on the 
mapping of statistical data. The ethnographical maps were of the utmost importance and 
several were produced even as the Austro-Hungarian Empire began to crumble (Hajdú, 
2000). The board of the society chose Károly Kogutowicz’s proposal from among four 
candidates in October 1918 (each map proposed different methods to illustrate the ethnic 
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composition of Hungary), and his detailed and accurate 1:200, 000 map was printed first 
(Segyevy, 2016).  
     Meanwhile, Teleki Pál – suffering from influenza and bedridden for three weeks in 
November-December 1918 – planned a more suggestive map which conveyed the Hungarian 
point of view far better (Benda, 2017). Combining data on language use with population 
density, Teleki’s map was presented to the Hungarian Geographical Society in January 1919, 
with Teleki suggesting that the society issue a manifesto to defend the integrity of the country 
(Ablonczy, 2007). Taking less than six weeks to prepare (Benda, 2017), Teleki’s iconic 
‘Carte Rouge’, so-called because it depicted the distribution of the Hungarian population in 
bright red, and properly titled (in English) The Ethnographical Map of Hungary According to 
Population Density (Figure 2), circulated in Hungarian academic geography and beyond. 
Issued in different European languages, Teleki’s ‘Carte Rouge’ became a symbol of 
Hungary’s ethnic identity and territorial integrity, under threat from neighbouring states and 
other ethnic groups (Seegel, 2018, pp. 64–66). Apponyi unfolded a copy during his speech in 
January 1920 (Macmillan, 2001, p. 277). The map, or variants and later editions, appeared 
within publications by Teleki and other Hungarian geographers (for example, Teleki, 1919a, 
1919b, 1923; Fodor, 1920a, 1920b, 1928; Anon. 1920–1922). 
     The Hungarian peace preparation work was interrupted by the revolutions in Budapest, 
and the Office for Peace Preparations was officially set up only in August 1919. The newly-
founded institution eventually became a department of the Foreign Ministry headed by 
Teleki, with Cholnoky as his deputy (Zeidler, 2017). Organizing the Office’s work proved 
difficult given conditions in Hungary in the wake of the country’s collapse. Cholnoky had 
been appointed as professor of geography at the University of Kolozsvár (today: Cluj, 
Romania) in 1905 and taught there during the war. Kolozsvár was occupied by the Romanian 
army at Christmas 1918, and Cholnoky had to flee the city after being briefly imprisoned in 
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the autumn of 1919 (Cholnoky, 1998). Almost the same happened to Ferenc Fodor, the other 
geographer and cartographer recruited to work in the Office. Fodor and his wife were 
suspended from secondary school teaching in the occupied town of Karánsebes (today: 
Caransebeș, Romania), and, after leaving most of their possessions behind, they managed to 
cross the demarcation lines, with Fodor arriving in Budapest in October 1919 (Fodor, 2016).  
     Even before their involvement in Paris, and eighteen months before Trianon, Teleki was 
urging Cholnoky to enlist others’ support ‘concerning the open questions of the future of our 
country’. He proposed that ‘the old man’ – [Hungarian geographer Lajos Lóczy] should 
travel to Britain ‘for he is on good terms with Scott Keltie and with others’. They planned 
correspondence with others: ‘Whose side do you think de Martonne will take? Shall we write 
to him?’ [As we show below, he favoured the Romanians]. As Teleki put it, ‘It would be very 
good if you summarized and then stressed in precise detail the following problem, namely 
that a country that has been deprived of all its iron, coal, timber, and precious minerals is very 
likely to become the hotbed of a new economic war. Moreover, given the loss of 4 million 
ethnic Hungarians, it is likely to give rise to a new irredentism’ (Teleki, 1918, November 6). 
Teleki wrote to Isaiah Bowman, his letter employing the same argument that he had 
suggested to Cholnoky two weeks earlier (Teleki, 1918, December 25). Personal connections 
between Lajos Lóczy and John Scott Keltie in the RGS to which Teleki appealed echoed 
those between Teleki, Cholnoky, and George Goudie Chisholm, lecturer in geography at the 
University of Edinburgh and a participant on the 1912 Transcontinental Excursion. Chisholm 
makes no direct mention of Trianon in his diaries, but preparatory notes on his teaching in 
this period show an awareness of the implications of ‘the Peace at Versailles’ and the decline 
of ‘Austro-Hungarian resources after the War’ (University of Edinburgh Collections, 
Chisholm, G., ca. December 1919, Gen. 1060/79, f. 227). 
<Figure 2 about here: half page, landscape, colour> 
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     Teleki’s letter to Cholnoky and his production of the ‘Carte Rouge’ suggest an awareness 
among individual geographers of the effects of Trianon in advance of the treaty’s formal 
ratification. Hungarian geographers’ reactions in general to Trianon stressed several themes. 
Key amongst them was the disruption to Hungary’s long-standing ‘natural geography’ – that, 
before Trianon, the Carpathian Mountains provided a natural defensive border, the Great 
Plain a core region, river systems, minerals, and forestry all disposed by nature and a 
beneficent (Christian) God.  
     The complex geographical argumentation for the defence of Hungary’s territorial integrity 
was laid down in ‘The Manifesto of the Hungarian Geographical Society to Geographical 
Societies of the World’, which was published in the Hungarian Geographical Bulletin in the 
last issue of 1918 (MFT, 1918). The detailed analysis was based upon the French géographie 
humaine approach. Teleki and his associates were aware that the French delegation in 
particular had to be convinced about the truth of Hungarian geographical concepts. Using a 
French weapon against them seemed the best strategy to legitimize Hungarian arguments. 
(Vidal de la Blache was the most cited person in the Manifesto [Krasznai, 2012]). The essay 
emphasised the geographical unity of the Carpathian Basin as a ‘perfect’ geographical region. 
It did not deny that the Hungarian Kingdom was linguistically divided, but stressed that it 
was a country with remarkable physical geographical boundaries: ʻIn all morphological, 
geological or tectonic maps, Hungary is recognisable as a well-defined, circular unity’ (MFT, 
1918, p. 292.) The territory of the Hungarian Kingdom was almost identical to the drainage 
system of the central section of the River Danube: the Manifesto specifically highlighted 
hydrographic issues and drew attention to the damaging effects of border demarcation on 
flood protection. ʻFlood control would be impossible if Hungary was divided […] according 
to the division plan of our enemies. Hungary’s Central-Tisza valley’s population and Serbia’s 
Lower-Tisza valley's population will need to be warned by the Slovaks (about flooding on the 
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Bodrog and Hernád rivers), by the Ruthenians (about flooding on the Tisza and Latorcza 
rivers), and by the Romanians (about flooding on the Visó, Szamos and Körös rivers)’ (MFT, 
1918, p. 301).  
     In addition to the physical geographical arguments, the Manifesto attested to a series of 
human geographical arguments for the protection of Hungary’s borders. For example, it 
pointed out that the new borders would disrupt the market zones that had been formed over 
the course of centuries where the mountains and plains met. The natural hinterlands of cities 
within the market zones would also be divided by the new border. The essay argued that 
border delimitation would result in the disintegration of the geographical division of labour 
that had developed over the centuries within the Carpathian Basin since, in an economic 
geographical sense, the Hungarian Kingdom was a functional unity of interdependent and 
complementary regions. The mountainous regions (today’s Slovakia, Transcarpathia, and a 
significant part of Transylvania) required agricultural products, which the central part of the 
basin, the Hungarian Great Plain, was able to supply. In exchange, mountainous areas 
supplied firewood, timber, coal, ore, and other raw materials and industrial products to 
agricultural areas. 
     This natural geography was consonant with Hungary as a political unit. Simply, Trianon 
ruptured the association between nature and nation. As geographer Ferenc Fodor put it in 
1928 in a different Justice for Hungary work, ‘Economic, political, cultural, and ethnographic 
conditions were radically upset here after the war. The result is a chaos which we may call a 
geographical discord’ (Fodor, 1928, p. 329, original emphasis). In support of their case, 
Teleki, Fodor, and others cited the work of German political geographers Friedrich Ratzel 
and Karl Haushofer, French geographer Élisée Reclus as we have seen, and, on boundaries, 
British surveyor Thomas Holdich. Apponyi cited Reclus in his January 1920 speech, the 
Frenchman having declared Hungary ‘to possess a geographical unity unrivalled in Europe. . . 
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. Historic Hungary . . . forms a natural geographic and economic unit such as stands alone in 
Europe’ (Deák, 1942, p. 546). To Apponyi, this geographical discord was ethnic and racial. 
Re-drawing Europe’s borders through such treaties, Trianon included, was at odds with one 
of US President Wilson’s 14 Point Manifesto informing the peace negotiations, that national 
unity should be arrived at through self-determination where possible (Tooze, 2004, pp. 119–
23). Post-Trianon, natural Hungary was broken, the legacy of an unthinking European geo-
politics shaped by Americans. ‘They have’, stressed Fodor, ‘forcibly destroyed the cultural 
work of a thousand years’ (Fodor, 1928, p. 351, original emphasis). 
     This background is important to understanding not just how Hungarian geographers felt 
but how Europe looked to Newbigin, Ogilvie and others, and to explanation of the work of 
Britain’s geographical representatives in Paris and in London. The British GSGS group 
would participate in the peace negotiations at a time when Hungary’s ‘dismembered’ 
geography, of enormous concern to her inhabitants, was a low order priority to Europe’s 
peacemakers. Hungary’s geographers could see the effect upon their nation even before the 
war’s end, and, before and after Trianon, sought justice for Hungary in appeals to the 
international community. How, then, did British geographers react to Trianon? How did 
Ogilvie and his colleagues undertake their geographical work?  
 
Aftermath and Boundary Settlement: Newbigin and Ogilvie reflect upon the new Europe 
 
In contrast to her Hungarian contemporaries, for Marion Newbigin the peace treaties that 
ended WWI did ‘not establish a new world’. ‘On the contrary’, she argued, ‘it is itself but an 
expression of the conflicting forces at work in the old one’ (Newbigin, 1920, p. 14). Her book 
begins with an admission of complexity: ‘The changes of frontier, and thus of territory, due 
to the Peace Treaty are so numerous and so complicated’ [as to make] ‘a purely geographical 
19 
 
classification useless’ (Newbigin, 1920, p. 5). In a work in ten chapters, the ‘dismemberment 
of Hungary’ together with analysis of Czechoslovakia is the subject of chapter 5.  
     Aftermath is largely a work of national political synthesis, each nation being considered in 
terms of its new borders. In the absence of citations to others’ work or notes to original 
sources, the research basis to Aftermath is unclear. Newbigin had earlier published on the 
Balkans (Newbigin, 1915a, 1915b) and, in 1918, wrote anonymously in an editorial capacity 
on the Armistice (Anon., 1918) (see also below). Hinks and Holdich are mentioned. No 
reference is made to the work of Hungarian geographers. Newbigin nevertheless understood 
the association between Hungary’s national bounds and its natural geography and the ethnic 
delimitation underlying Hungary post-Trianon: ‘if an ordinary map gives rise to the 
impression that the old kingdom was a natural unit, an ethnographical map shows that this 
notion is illusory’ (Newbigin, 1920, p. 58). It was illusory not only because physiographic 
boundaries did not equate to political ones but also because the focus on ethnicity disguised 
social relationships in which the Hungarians had exerted an unwelcome authority upon other 
nationalities – ‘to Magyarise them by continuous pressure’ as she put it (Newbigin, 1920, p. 
59) – and because Hungary’s delimitation along ethnic grounds was ‘largely dictated by the 
Western Powers’ in ignorance of these social dimensions. What she called ‘the principle of 
nationality’ – delimitation along ethnic grounds – was ‘some form of logical basis’ 
(Newbigin, 1920, p. 88), but dismissal of social hierarchies was imprudent in the longer term.  
     Aftermath thus offers a description of the new Europe with relatively little depth of 
enquiry. Her sense was that the reduction of Hungary to, effectively, the Great Plain reflected 
the concentration of ‘the Magyar people’, and that those lands given up under Trianon were 
areas in which the Hungarians had exerted undue influence over other ethnicities. This, for 
Newbigin a social rather than an ethnic question, held dangers for the future: ‘It is indeed far 
from improbable that, within the confines of the Old Hungary, the economic and social 
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problem will prove to be more fundamental than the racial one, important as this may appear 
on the surface’ (Newbigin, 1920, p. 63). 
     In contrast to Newbigin’s, Ogilvie’s Boundary Settlement (1922), written by someone who 
undertook the work in situ, is dense with detail on the principles and practices by which 
Europe’s peace-time boundaries were arrived at. Ogilvie’s book is a thirty-two page pamphlet 
published by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge and overseen by Harold 
Temperley. In introduction, Ogilvie noted that the work was ‘intended as an aid in the study 
of the Treaty of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly, and should be read in 
conjunction with the territorial clauses of those Treaties’ (Ogilvie, 1922, p. iii). This almost 
certainly is a veiled reference to Temperley’s multi-volume history of the treaties marking the 
end of WWI (Temperley, 1920). Ogilvie begins in a geographical tone: 
      
 The basal conditions underlying the territorial decisions of the Peace Conference may  
be considered as geographical in a broader and a narrower sense. In seeking to change 
the political allegiance of a population from one State to another, the Conference 
arrived first at reducing the ethnic variety in the States, and secondly at finding 
frontiers which would leave the newly constituted territories with adequate 
communications, internal and external, which would possess no inherent sources of 
military irritation, and which would interfere as little as possible with the existing 
material life of the peoples affected – unless, of course, the alteration were to be for 




 At the Peace Conference the term “geographical” was used officially in its narrower  
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sense, which may be held equivalent to “topographical”. A Central Geographical 
Committee was formed whose functions were first to ensure that all boundaries 
selected were easy to establish and maintain, and that they were properly delimited, 
and secondly to prepare instructions for the Demarcation Commissions (Ogilvie, 
1922, p. 5). 
 
     This suggests certain emphases and structures for the different treaties within the Paris 
Conference. Ogilvie pointed also to the difficulties of actually implementing these and other 
statements of principle and at the unequal power relations between the national delegations 
involved.  
     The Allied and associated powers wholly avoided discussions of ethnic and geographic 
questions in replying to comments from the Hungarian delegation (Ogilvie, 1922, p. 7). Most 
experts would have agreed, Ogilvie observed, to further principles over what a ‘good frontier’ 
should do: include the maximum number of their own nationals within their borders and a 
minimum of other nationalities; not disturb existing administrative boundaries; consider local 
requirements; avoid sharp salients; make use of well-defined natural features; afford the best 
facilities for economic life and avoid disrupting existing lines of communication.  
     In Part II of the book, Ogilvie pointed out how application of these principles and basal 
conditions to ‘the Austrian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian Treaties’ was compromised not just by 
the facts of geography but particularly what he called ‘la haute politique’ such that 
‘principles were stated only in a vague and general fashion’ (Ogilvie, 1922, p. 7). Of the new 
Czechoslovakia, for example, from Bohemia to Ruthenia the new state presented ‘a gradually 
narrowing figure corresponding to the outline of the mountain system’. For economic and 
political as well as strategic reasons, the conference ‘to a large extent, set aside the ethnic line 
as a boundary’ (Ogilvie, 1922, pp. 12, 14). The search for a boundary between Hungary and 
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Yugoslavia conforming to ethnographical divisions ‘proved to be most difficult’, as it did on 
the Romanian boundary given ‘the remarkable mosaic of races’ (Ogilvie, 1922, p. 21). On all 
sides, and it is a point stressed in Part II of Boundary Settlement, Hungary’s ethnic diversity 
made positioning its new border problematic. No matter which boundary was under review –
that with Yugoslavia, or Romania especially, ‘considerable numbers of alien population must 
necessarily be included’ (Ogilvie, 1922, 23). Recognising, for example, that the boundary on 
the northern plain around Baranya, the Bačka/Bácska and the Banat was a compromise – 
‘open to criticism’ as he put it of Hungary’s proposed borders with Romania in general 
(Ogilvie, 1922, 25) – Ogilvie observed that too much consideration was given to rail 
connections: ‘the railway question manifestly controlled the decision’ (Ogilvie, 1922, pp. 26). 
The motivations for delimiting the new boundaries between Austria and Hungary were 
‘firstly ethnic and secondly economic’ (Ogilvie, 1922, p. 28). Romania’s new borders, 
meantime, with ethnic factors to the fore, were re-cast by French geographer Emmanuel de 
Martonne (Palsky, 2002). 
     In sum, statements in principle were compromised by geographical circumstances and 
might be compromised further by the different bases upon which boundaries could be 
decided: ethnicity (principally), physiography, and lines of communication. Hungary’s 
Trianon borders did not reflect the basal conditions identified for the Conference – nor, for 
Ogilvie (or for Newbigin), did they properly adhere to Wilson’s principle of national self-
determination. They did not, in part, given differences within the American delegation as to 
how that delegation was to work and what role was to be played by ethnic mapping (Lansing, 
1921; Gelfand, 1963). They did not – because they could not – reflect the country’s ethnic 
diversity, or its physiography (a view articulated by Fodor amongst Hungarian geographers). 
For the Americans in particular, Hungary was never going to be the same given an Austro-
Hungarian Empire which ‘had fallen to pieces’ (Lansing, 1921, p. 224): reflecting upon the 
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issue, Bowman simply stated ‘The new Hungary is indeed a problem’ (Bowman, 1922, p. 
218). Given their joint involvement and the timing of their reflections upon geography, peace 
work, mapping the new Europe, it would be instructive to compare Ogilvie’s 1922 work on 
the new Europe he helped delineate with Bowman’s contemporaneous view of the new world 
order (Bowman, 1922). Here, however, our concern is with Ogilvie’s work and competing 
views within Britain’s geographical community.           
                   
The work of peace: Alan Ogilvie and Britain’s geographers in Paris and in London 
 
Reporting in April 1920 upon ‘Geography at the Congress [sic] of Paris’, Arthur Hinks began 
by noting ‘When history comes to deal with the peace settlement it may well study how far 
the precepts of geography were followed by the Congress of Paris. It will be well, therefore, 
to note now the extent to which geographical opinion was at the disposal of the Allied and 
Associated Powers both in preparation for the Congress and throughout its deliberations’ 
(Anon., 1920, p. 309).  
     In Paris, in Hinks’ view, decisions on the territorial changes involved four main processes. 
The first was ‘the decision as to the larger political divisions of the future; secondly the 
search for the best kind of frontier in each case; thirdly the definition and delimitation of the 
new boundaries; and lastly the provision of boundary commissions for the demarcation on the 
ground’. Although each was ‘geographical to a greater or lesser extent’ – the first in 
particular was ‘the affair of geography in its widest sense’ – Hinks doubted ‘if the opinion of 
geographers had any great weight in the decisions of the first magnitude’ (Anon., 1920, p. 
310). He was similarly doubtful over their involvement in the third and fourth processes. By 
contrast, the second process – ‘the choice of the best frontier’ – required ‘geographical 
knowledge of several kinds’. This included the ability ‘to appraise the relative value of large-
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scale maps’ [and] ‘knowledge of the kind of boundary which would be easily fixed in a 
permanent manner on the ground, and . . . the ability to choose lines which would interfere as 
little as possible with the economic life of the various districts’ (Anon., 1920, p. 310). Despite 
work by the intelligence sections of several British government departments, Hinks was 
circumspect over the geographical work done before Paris: ‘it is doubtful if the British 
delegation as a whole obtained full value for the labour expended before the armistice’ 
(Anon., 1920, p. 310).  
     Hinks’ separation of the geographical work done in Paris from that undertaken before the 
Peace Conference gets ‘behind’ the descriptions of Newbigin and of Ogilvie but not fully. 
British geographers’ peace work involved moving between Paris and the RGS, as well as 
boundary work in Paris. In addition to his wife, Ogilvie was the most mobile, the London-
based Hedley the most sedentary (we know little of Major Wynne, nothing of Captain Parker, 
Ogilvie’s replacement from August 1919). Ogilvie’s work is also explicable in relation to his 
prior experiences. By 1919, Ogilvie’s involvement in boundary work, in Paris and in London, 
and in liaising between delegations would expose him to inadequacies in British geography. 
British geographers had recognised not only the difficulty of mapping ethnicity in the 
Hungarian context but also what they considered Hungarians’ unwarranted dominance of 
other ethnicities some years before. Nor was all boundary work the same.  
 
British Geographical Interests in Hungary before Trianon 
British geographers recognised the problems presented by mapping nationalities in Hungary 
several years before Teleki and colleagues produced the ‘Carte Rouge’ and before the war 
ended. Evidence for this comes from a paper read before the RGS in November 1915. At 
Hinks’ suggestion, geography teacher B. C. Wallis presented work on questions of Hungary’s 
mapping that had arisen during the compilation of the 1:1 million map of Europe underway in 
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the RGS. Wallis was an advocate of statistical teaching and illustration within geography and 
cartography (Wallis, 1911). As Wallis stated, and Hinks came to realise, ‘Hungary probably 
presents the greatest difficulty to the map-maker since there are no less than seven different 
nationalities under Hungarian rule’ (Wallis, 1916, p. 177). Wallis’s paper was, in one sense, 
an exercise in comparative cartography. Using 1910 census data (as would Teleki), Wallis 
produced different map types – by density, area, line, isopleth, choropleth, and so on – to 
demonstrate the complexity of mapping nationalities based upon language use. In a more 
significant sense, what mattered was the message to which his maps led him. His 
interpretation of them was of the dominance of ‘the Magyars’ [Hungarians] and their 
suppression of other ethno-linguistic groups: ‘Magyar culture is not propagated peacefully’ 
(Wallis, 1916, p. 185). 
     In the discussion that followed, Wallis’s innovative cartography was welcomed despite the 
author’s admission that it was work in progress (he had, in Hinks’ presence, already spoken 
on this work to the 1915 BAAS meeting). Discussants included Britain’s leading economic 
geographer, Lionel Lyde of University College London. Lyde knew Wallis, shared his 
interests in statistics in his own university teaching, but disagreed with Wallis’s positioning 
of boundaries on ethnic grounds: ‘I believe that a river is the right political frontier and that 
you should have the frontier on the river’ (Lyde et al., 1916, p. 188). Lyde’s view – that 
physical, and not human geographical features, should be the basis to borders – was 
consistent with his earlier work on military geography (Lyde, 1905), and with his recognition 
of the importance of geography and mapping in times of war (Holdich and Lyde, 1915: cf. 
Belloc, 1915). It was consistent, too, with his views on boundaries in a future Europe (Lyde, 
1915). As he wrote in Some Frontiers of To-morrow, ‘the key to all the rest really lies with 
Hungary, where the physical basis is really simple, but the political issues are momentous’ 
26 
 
(Lyde, 1915, p. 82). This view on natural borders was shared with Britain’s pre-eminent 
exponent of boundary mapping.  
     Thomas Holdich spent his working life mapping political boundaries on natural bases – in 
Afghanistan, the Pamirs, Baluchistan, the Andean Cordillera – and, in retirement, writing 
about them in times of war. Holdich’s Political Frontiers and Boundary Making (1916) 
reflects this lifetime’s achievement. Like others, Holdich was looking at a Europe then at war 
and to a future peace. To Holdich, there were two essential conditions of an international 
‘scientific frontier’: ‘that it should be a barrier in the first place, and that the position of that 
barrier should be selected with due reference to the will of the people chiefly concerned in the 
second’ (Holdich, 1916, p. 286). Barriers to Holdich meant physical features, mountain 
ranges or topography that afforded what he called ‘command’: ‘Command, in these days of 
artillery dominance, is, indeed, all important’ (Holdich, 1916, p. 288) as it was in an age 
before air power changed warfare forever. On these terms, there were ‘few scientific frontiers 
in Europe’ (Holdich, 1916, p. 286). Presciently, Holdich gazed eastwards in looking to the 
future: ‘It is in Central Europe that the great difficulties of readjustment will arise; the origin 
of those difficulties being based on the intermixture of nationalities which refuse to 
assimilate, . . . . This intermixture again is chiefly due to the geographical conformation of a 
vast area of country which presents no natural features which might serve as a physical 
obstacle to mutual trespass’ (Holdich, 1916, p. 293). Poland presented ‘the greatest 
complexity’ – ‘a sort of cockpit for Central Europe, a convenient centre for the settlement of 
disputes’ (Holdich, 1916, p. 295). Hungary did not merit concern: ‘Hungary is a State which 
calls for little sympathy both as an enemy in the present war and as a tyrant over smaller 
nationalities in times of peace’ (Holdich, 1916, p. 302).  
     Within the RGS, different views were held over what boundary work was. Holdich’s life-
long emphasis upon mountain ranges and military ‘command’ – for Hungary, one obvious 
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border was the Carpathians – and his attitude toward that country’s future boundaries as 
being difficult to effect in terms of ethnicity was one view. In later work, written as the war 
was ending and from his position as RGS President, Holdich dismissed the idea of a natural-
national Hungary – ‘wherever the dividing line may be drawn, there is no prospect of basing 
it on strong national features’ (Holdich, 1918, p. 118). Lyde held to natural boundaries, 
chiefly to rivers, but less strongly than Holdich. Wallis and Hinks held to a yet different view, 
that of ethnic delimitations. In peace work in Paris, this was the view and practice that 
predominated.  
 
Drawing Boundaries in War and Peace: Alan Ogilvie at Work in Paris and London 
 
Alan Ogilvie and Walter Coote Hedley knew one another before they worked together in 
Paris and London. They met following Ogilvie’s presentation to the RGS in July 1914 on the 
cartographic needs of physical geography (Ogilvie, 1915). Hedley was head of GSGS; 
Ogilvie, then a demonstrator in geography at Oxford, was completing a research degree on 
the physical geography of the coasts of the Moray Firth (Withers, 2010b). Ogilvie’s 1915 
paper is more important here than its content might suppose. In stressing the value of maps, 
to physical geography especially and to scientific geography generally, Ogilvie observed that 
physiography was hampered by the limited availability of maps of different scales, their 
price, and by limited coordination between Britain’s map-making institutions. While 
Ogilvie’s remarks upon physiography hint at an affinity with the landform analyses of 
William Morris Davis – perhaps gleaned during the 1912 Transcontinental Excursion – his 
criticism of existing map provision, chiefly of the Ordnance Survey, is the more important 
point. In discussion, both Holdich and Hedley admitted that the Ordnance Survey, the GSGS 
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and geographical societies such as the RGS, should do more to produce maps appropriate to 
different needs.  
     Hedley first contacted Ogilvie over work for the GSGS in July 1915, Ogilvie noting the 
fact in his diary: ‘By appointment saw Col. W. C. Hedley RE at War Office - asked me to go 
to Nr. East as map compiler. Agreed’ (Ogilvie, A., Diaries, 9 July 1915). Ogilvie was by then 
in France as an officer in the 7th London Brigade of the Field Artillery. Ogilvie was more 
forthcoming (and self-deprecating) regarding his prospective map work in writing to his 
immediate superior in the Intelligence Corps, Major Dunnington Jefferson: ‘He [Hedley] is 
anxious to send me to the Near East to do a kind of map compilation for which I gather that 
he thinks I am specially suited’ (Ogilvie Papers, Ogilvie, A. G., n.d., but ca. July 1915). In 
fact, Ogilvie had applied for intelligence work on 30 May 1915 given his geographical 
qualifications, his ability in French and German (Ogilvie had studied in Paris and in Berlin 
before the war), and the no-doubt crucial fact that ‘I can ride a motor cycle; but have never 
repaired one’ (Ogilvie Papers, Ogilvie, A., ca. July 1915). This evidence affirms the Near 
East focus of the GSGS and the RGS at that time (Heffernan, 1996) and adds new details 
given Ogilvie’s hitherto-undisclosed agency in application to the GSGS.  
     Ogilvie never got to the Near East. Changed orders directed him to Salonika and the Maps 
and Survey Section of the General Staff (Salonica) Expeditionary Force. This work, over-
looked in studies of Ogilvie (Withers, 2010b), has a direct bearing on Ogilvie’s later 
endeavours in Paris and upon his 1922 book. The work of the Maps and Survey Section in 
Salonika was in four subsections: field surveys, compilation of maps from field surveys, 
‘reproduction of maps for the use of troops’, and map issue. Ogilvie was in charge of the 
reproduction section (located in a disused café near to Army Headquarters). The work 
involved map colouring, tracing boundary lines and overseeing print runs of between 500 and 
2,300 maps a day, depending on the number of colours used. The British printing equipment 
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– ‘45 years old and [which] required constant repair and much trouble to maintain register’ – 
was better than that available to Britain’s allies: Ogilvie’s section assisted the French and the 
topographical section of the Serbian Army in its map work (Report on the Work of the 
Printing Section, R.E. from January to December 1916, Ogilvie papers). In January 1917, the 
four branches were merged, giving Ogilvie experience in other areas of map work. On leave 
in February 1917, Ogilvie was instructed to travel via Rome to take advantage of Italian 
expertise in aerial photography and map making. By the time that Hedley directed his formal 
transfer to GSGS in March 1918, it is arguable that no one in British geographical circles 
rivalled Ogilvie’s academic understanding of the power of maps and his practical experience 
of what map making, boundary work, and map printing involved.  
     Ogilvie’s expertise was in demand within days of the 11 November 1918 Armistice. A 
planned paper to the RGS on Macedonia, he advised Hinks, would have to be postponed, 
since ‘it is possible though by no means certain that I shall be required abroad during Peace 
negociations [sic]’ (Ogilvie, A., Diaries, 13 November 1918). On 6 February 1919, Ogilvie 
and Hedley attended the first meeting of the ‘Conference of Geographical Representatives of 
Delegations of Great Powers + Belgium’ at which meeting ‘Resolutions [were] drawn up 
provisionally for presenting to P[eace]. C[onference]. Secy use of 1/M map for Definitions & 
other maps to be settled on by geog. experts’ (Ogilvie, A., Diaries, 6 February 1919). This 
was the ‘Central Geographical Committee’ referred to in Boundary Settlement (Ogilvie, 
1922, p. 6). That same day he wrote to Hinks: ‘The work here is coming in thick and fast, 
which by the grace of God will mean that the Peace Congress will be short & sweet’ (Ogilvie, 
A., Diaries, 6 February 1919). The work would in fact prove so voluminous and complicated 
(as he made clear in retrospect in 1922) that after securing Hedley and Hinks’ permission he 
directed his wife, Evelyn, to use the RGS’s library to access geographical information which 
she then forwarded to him in Paris. This also involved speaking with Hinks, attending 
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lectures, and meeting with Holdich and Keltie (whom she knew from Oxford) (Ogilvie, E., 
Diaries, 26 February 1919, 27 March 1919, 8 May 1919, 29 May 1919). She later travelled to 
Paris to help Ogilvie.  
     Alan Ogilvie’s diaries from early February 1919 are full of terse entries on his work: 
‘coached H. Nicolson’ [Harold Nicolson, member of the British delegation] ‘on Albanian 
Greek frontier’ (13 February 1919); ‘Planned new map of Poland’ (14 February 1919); ‘drew 
frontiers for Albania & Serbia Bulgaria’ (19 February 1919); ‘Drew strategic frontier on 
Greece - Bulgaria in Thrace to agree as nearly as possible with ethnography. Submitted to 
Harold Nicholson’ (21 February 1919). The work continued unabated: ‘Tues. 4 [March] All 
day on frontiers’. His first mention of Hungary is 6 March 1919 in which, at a meeting with 
Johnson, de Martonne and an Italian diplomat, the business was ‘frontier of Cz. Slov. & 
Roumanians & Magyars’. The following evening, Ogilvie called on Cvijić of the Yugoslav 
delegation. On Sunday 16 March 1919, Ogilvie lunched with others in a ‘reunion of the 1912 
Excursion’, including De Martonne, Gallois, Demangeon, Brunhes, Bowman, and Johnson. 
Into April, Ogilvie worked on the ‘Jugo-Slav. Frontier’ (3 April, 1919), ‘S. Poland for 
meandering river frontiers’ (7 April, 1919), and, on 15 May 1919, ‘all day office on the 
Hungary & Galician armistice’ (Ogilvie, A., Diaries, dates as given).  
     While this illustrates the nature and intensity of the work, and the day-to-day activities 
hinted at in his Boundary Settlement, two further points are salient. Busy as he was in Paris, 
Ogilvie found time to pursue his own research. This, initially, was glaciological work, which 
he had begun in 1912 and would discuss in Paris with French geographer Pierre Rabot. 
Principally, it was research on Macedonia that certainly stemmed from his Salonika work and 
from boundary mapping in Paris. Ogilvie presented his delayed work on Macedonia to the 
RGS on 24 March 1919 during a period of leave: it appeared the following year (Ogilvie, 
1920). At Bowman’s insistence, a related paper appeared in an American journal (Ogilvie, 
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1921). In May 1919, Ogilvie apologised to Hinks over delays in this other work, ‘although I 
can honestly plant some of the guilt on the draughtsmen of the Treaties whose slave I am at 
present’ (Ogilvie, A., Diaries, 22 May 1919). By then, he was working with Harold 
Temperley, as well as with Hedley and Nicolson. In his diary entry for 24 May 1919, 
Temperley – who had spent the afternoon in dispute with the Italian delegation over which 
mountain peaks might form points on their borders – records instructing Ogilvie ‘to do his 
best to keep them on the crests of hills and not to give offensive military advantage to them 
[the Italians]’ (Temperley, 1920, p. 427). This suggests a Holdich-like attention to physical 
geography and ‘command’ in boundary work, at least from the Italians. Temperley’s six-
volume History of the Peace Conference lists Ogilvie’s work more fully. Ogilvie was 
responsible for the four sketch maps in volume I, the seven in volume II, and what Temperley 
called ‘the geographical direction of volumes I-III’ (Temperley, 1920, II, p. v). This work, 
under Temperley’s direction, explains why Temperley called upon Ogilvie to present his war 
work for publication as Boundary Settlement, a fact Ogilvie acknowledged in the preface 
(Ogilvie, 1922, iii).  
     Intense as they were, the Paris peace negotiations were strongly social, a fact some 
contemporaries found disquieting after the ravages of war (Macmillan, 2001, pp. 157–61). As 
Temperley noted, ‘At meals, and when off duty, there was no convention to forbid discussion 
of the business in hand. A unique opportunity was thus given to every specialist of grasping 
the relation of his own particular question to all the others involved, and of seeing its place in 
the vast problem of reconstruction before the Congress’ (Temperley, 1920, I, p. vi). On 
occasion, Ogilvie dined with Lawrence of Arabia (‘Talk with T. E. Lawrence re Syria & 
claims’, 18 February 1919: they met again, at the RGS, in March 1919). His dinner 
companions, when not Temperley and Nicolson, were more usually geographers from other 
delegations: de Margerie, Bowman, Johnson. Evelyn Ogilvie recalled a dinner with 
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Temperley – ‘who regaled us with gossip’ (Ogilvie, E., Diaries, 16 June 1919). On 29 May 
1919, Ogilvie recorded his day’s work in his diary: ‘Long day on Treaty. Afternoon at Quai 
d’Orsay. Final definition of S. Frontier of Austria and Basin of Klagenfurt as for plebescite 
[sic] - settled by the “4” this morning [Woodrow Wilson, Lloyd George, Georges 
Clemenceau, Vittorio Orlando (Italian Premier)]. At this meeting of the Central Territorial 
Committee it was clear that owing to absence of ministers at the meeting of the “4” there was 
divergence of view as to what decision was. Dined with M. & Mdm Cvijic - Gallois, de 
Margerie & Johnson there. Afterwards discussed possibility of founding in future an 
international geog. Journal or annual for large works - like Petermanns supplements’ 
(Ogilvie, A., Diaries, 29 May 1919).  
     The Paris Peace Conference allowed geographers of different nations to demonstrate their 
proficiencies in re-drawing Europe’s boundaries and along different lines, principally ethnic 
but also physiographic – de Martonne for Romania, Romer for Poland, Cvijić for Yugoslavia, 
and Ogilvie with others for Britain and Europe more generally (Palsky, 2002; Ginsburger, 
2016; Labbé, 2018). We should see their work as a compromise between different principles, 
with ethnic considerations to the fore. Ogilvie’s Boundary Settlement makes this clear. Even 
Bowman admitted to the limited quality of some map work. Congratulating Ogilvie on his 
Manchester appointment in a letter of September 1919, Bowman noted how he was sending 
on ‘a set of base maps and block diagrams which were prepared here [the AGS] for the use of 
the Peace Conference. In using them be sure to remember that they were prepared under great 
pressure, in large part by inexpert draftsmen, and that they have many defects’ (Bowman to 
Ogilvie, American Geographical Society Archive, 18 September 1919). The Paris conference 
also afforded opportunities for international exchange over the nature of geography at a time 
when the subject, in Britain and in America, was in formation (Dunbar, 2001; Martin, 2015). 
At the same time, and as he worked alongside Bowman, Johnson, de Margerie and others in 
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delimiting Europe’s future geographies, Alan Ogilvie came to see inadequacies in Britain’s 
geographical capacities in the present.        
 
Institutional Differences, Personal Opportunities 
 
On 2 April 1919, after a ‘quiet day’ walking in the Bois de Boulogne, Ogilvie wrote to Hinks 
in a letter marked ‘Private’. In part, the letter was about Ogilvie’s uncertainty over applying 
for the post of reader in geography at Oxford, news of which vacancy had come from Henry 
Dickson, geographer, meteorologist, and, in WWI, head of the Geographical Section of the 
Admiralty’s Naval Intelligence division. Ogilvie’s expressed anxiety over this matter centred 
upon a possible slight to his friend H. O. Beckit in Oxford were Ogilvie to apply and be 
successful (Beckit did get the post). But this was a preface to his real intent in writing:  
 
 You will recall the conversation which we had on the subject of Geography in the  
direct service of the State Government. I daily become more impressed with the need 
for some such organization which will serve all government departments. I hope that 
Lord Curzon and Amery are now putting a scheme to the Cabinet, and I imagine that 
the R.G.S will be asked officially for its views. It is quite obvious that the cooperation 
of the Society is necessary in some form or another and it is also quite clear that one 
or more geographers will have to be found directly the scheme is approved. Moreover 
the geographers – or at least one of them – will have to have the capacity of bringing 
the organisation into touch with the actual work of govt. depts. and he will want 
plenty of tact in so doing. I have recently reviewed the field in my own mind, and 
frankly – without wishing in the first instance to come to this conclusion – I have 
become faced with the realization that none is better qualified for this work than I am 
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myself. . . . . I cannot get away from the fact that my years work in London and here 
has given me very considerable insight into the needs of the various departments of 
State & their present tendencies (RGS-IBG Archives, CB8, Ogilvie to Hinks, 2 April 
1919).  
 
Quite when Ogilvie’s conversation with Hinks took place is unclear. Hinks and Hedley were 
corresponding about it in early January 1919. Hinks outlined the possibility of a ‘proposed 
new Geographical Department’ as ‘a Memorandum on my own responsibility’. In being 
written at Christmas, however, Hinks considered this could have ‘no opportunity of 
consultation with the President and the Council of the RGS’ (RGS-IBG Archives, CB8, 
Hinks to Hedley, 8 January 1919). In the memorandum in question, an anonymous undated 
typescript entitled ‘The Need for Pooling the Geographical Information at the Disposal of the 
Government’, the deficiencies of British geographical work, in war and peace, are made 
clear.  
     The GSGS had done admirably in the war, but the OS had not ‘the same experience of 
general geographical work’. The geographical sections of British intelligence had drawn 
heavily upon the RGS. There has been ‘much overlapping and waste of effort in the attempts 
made by several newly created departments to supply the geographical handbooks and 
memoranda required by the Government in the conduct of the war and in the preparation of 
peace’. The RGS, on the other hand, was the natural home for Britain’s geographical 
coordination: ‘A Government Bureau of Geography attached to the Society would be a 
natural development of the services which the Society has always in the past, and especially 
during the last four years of war, been willing and able to render to the nation’ (RGS-IBG 
Archives, CB8, Hinks’ papers). The universities and the scientific societies should also be 
involved in this new body. These ideas and reflections were clearly Ogilvie’s and rooted in 
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his experiences. Responsibility for their transmission to higher authorities lay with Hinks: for 
reasons to do with the aftermath of a hard-won war and the time of year (Christmas 1918), 
they were not acted upon.  
     This is not a digression from Trianon, Paris, and the work of boundary mapping. Ogilvie’s 
activities as the leading British geographer in the peace negotiations, together with his prior 
experience, afforded him insight, as no other individual, into the capacity of British 
geography to work with and for Government. The RGS coordinated the 1:1 million mapping 
project for the British. In Paris and in London, mapping Hungary was a departure from this 
and was work in progress. In London since 1915, the work of Wallis, Lyde, and Holdich was 
an exercise in comparative cartography set against competing views over the nature of 
political boundaries. In Paris since 1919, mapping Hungary’s revised borders was part of the 
geography of European peace.  
     Ogilvie’s letter to Hinks signals, of course, to personal ambition as much as disquiet over 
the geographical capacities of different government departments. Hinks’ letter to Hedley and 
his memorandum following Ogilvie’s promptings suggests that, as Europe’s boundaries were 
being re-drawn – Hungary last and most extremely of all – there was no shared view from 
within British geography over that work, over the nature of boundaries, or institutional 
coordination over map provision.  
     This claim has earlier support in Ogilvie’s remarks about maps and British geographical 
coordination in his 1915 paper. Differences of view were certainly apparent in British 
geography. Britain’s leading geo-politician, Halford Mackinder, considered geography an 
important aid to statecraft (Mackinder, 1919; see also Parker, 1982), yet he was not involved 
in the practical questions of boundary work after 1918 (Kearns, 2009), this being the preserve 
of Hinks, Lyde and Holdich in the RGS, and, in Paris, of Ogilvie and Hedley for the British 
and Bowman for the Americans and the AGS. Hinks’ authoritative management of the RGS, 
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and his editorial oversight of the society’s Geographical Journal, did not endear him to 
contemporaries. As Heffernan notes, Hinks was taken aback by Bowman’s repeated requests 
for the RGS’s 1:1 million maps and GSGS war maps: their relationship quickly deteriorated 
‘into a mutual loathing as intense as it was long-lasting’ (Heffernan, 1996, p. 521). An 
astronomer by training with a predisposition to accuracy and precision, Hinks did not take to 
the ‘modern’ thematic human geography emerging in this period (Withers, Finnegan and 
Higgitt, 2006). As late as 1930, Bowman wrote to Ogilvie of Hinks’ continued disfavour: ‘By 
the way you will be interested to hear that a number of geographers here have made a 
combined assault upon the R.G.S. on the character of the Geographical Journal. Outwardly at 
least we have had an overwhelming victory. But I think old Hinks is quite unrepentant + time 
alone will show whether the Journal turns over a new leaf’. (American Geographical Society 
Archives and Library, Bowman to Ogilvie, 25 January 1930). Given Hinks’ control of the 
Geographical Journal, his antipathy toward Bowman and the American delegation, his long-
standing defence of the RGS as a centre of geographical authority despite leading 
individuals’ indecision over boundary work, British geographers with interests in the new 
Europe looked elsewhere for space to examine Hungary’s diminished place in the new 
Europe.  
 
British geographers debate the Hungary question, c.1915–c.1922 
 
The annual meetings of section E, Geography, of the BAAS were vital settings for the 
development and public promotion of geography, in the early twentieth century in particular. 
The RGS had close connections with government circles, evening lectures, and had supported 
the establishment of teaching departments in several British universities, but was in 
something of an ‘academic crisis’ in the early twentieth century (Withers, 2010a, pp. 198–
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231). It was slow to have a research committee and, in the opinion of many early professional 
practitioners, neglected human geography in favour of papers on exploration and did so in 
part because of Hinks’ authoritarian control of the Geographical Journal and personal 
disdain for human geographical research – hence Bowman’s comments to Ogilvie in 1930. 
Even by the early 1930s, there was still evidence, as its then president put it, that the RGS 
‘was inclined to neglect the human and educational aspects of geography’ (Withers, 2010a, p. 
223). In contrast, contemporaries recognised the research emphases of the Scottish 
Geographical Magazine under Newbigin’s editorship, and the meetings of the BAAS as a 
forum for debate.  
 
Hungary discussed at the BAAS 
 
Both Hinks and Wallis spoke at the 1915 BAAS meeting in Manchester, the former 
presenting work on the 1:1 million map in the RGS, the latter his comparative maps on the 
difficulties of portraying racial distribution, using the Budapest sheet of the 1:1 million map 
as exemplar (McF. [John McFarlane], 1915, p. 375). In his published presidential address to 
section E (war work prevented its verbal delivery), H. G. Lyons emphasised the need for 
research in geography and ‘the advancement of scientific geography’ (Lyons, 1915, p. 269). 
The war hampered BAAS activities not just Lyons’. Attendance in Manchester was low: 
Hinks described it as a ‘rather curious, half-alive sort of meeting’ but pronounced himself 
‘glad to be there as I made the acquaintance of Miss Newbigin’ (Hinks to Keltie, RGS, CB8, 
10 September 1915). Attendance was lower still in Newcastle in 1916: there were no annual 
meetings in 1917 and 1918 (Withers, 2010a, p. 49). Hungary and the new Europe were of 
renewed interest only in the aftermath of WWI.  
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     Marion Newbigin’s paper on the geographical significance of the November 1918 
Armistice, published within weeks of the war’s end, has the hallmarks of a provisional piece 
(Newbigin, 1918). She recognised that publication of ‘detailed maps showing the armistice 
conditions is not meantime possible’ (Newbigin, 1918, p. 441). Proposals for the ‘evacuation 
of Austro-Hungarian territories to a line which is specified in much detail’ (Newbigin, 1918, 
p. 443) suggest that Newbigin was privy to information not yet in the public domain. But 
given the dates noted above by Ogilvie on his and others’ work in Paris (February to May 
1919), this is unlikely. More probably this reflected Newbigin’s existing knowledge of east 
central Europe (Newbigin, 1915a, 1915b), hearing Hinks and Wallis in Manchester, and her 
understanding of the difficulties of mapping race and nationality (Newbigin, 1917). There is 
no evidence to suggest that she met with Ogilvie to discuss Europe’s boundary mapping. 
They did meet at the 1922 BAAS meeting in Hull when Newbigin, then section E president, 
spoke on the ‘new’ human geography: (Newbigin, 1922b; 1923). Lyde, McFarlane, and 
Rudmose Brown were also amongst those in Hull with whom Ogilvie ‘met & talked’ 
(Ogilvie, A., Diaries, 22 September 1922).   
   Newbigin turned to the political geography of the new Europe at the first post-war BAAS 
meeting, in Bournemouth in 1919, speaking on aspects of nationality and the new 
internationalism (Newbigin, 1921). Her theme was echoed by section E’s president, Lionel 
Lyde, on a topic long of interest to him – rivers as national and international boundaries. 
Acknowledging that ‘this subject was chosen before the publication of the Treaty of Peace’, 
Lyde stressed that it was ‘dictated by a wish to combine my geographical creed with the 
political geographies of an ‘Americanised’ Europe’ (Lyde, 1921, 212). Reminding his 
audience how ‘In recent years I have pleaded for the use of rivers as political boundaries’ 
(Lyde, 1921, 213), Lyde sought not to undermine the ethnic basis to boundary mapping that 
underlay Trianon and the new Europe, but to endorse an ethic of post-war internationalism – 
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‘to preserve the valuable variety of political and cultured units, but to draw the various units 
together. Our object is unity, not uniformity’ (Lyde, 1921, 213). Lyde’s address may be read 
as an unsuccessful appeal to a particular sort of boundary mapping, one not used by those 
geographers in Europe engaged in the peace negotiations (or shared by Holdich, his British 
counterpart). We should not lose sight, however, of his internationalist intentions or of the 
fact that, like Newbigin, Lyons and others, Lyde spoke at a time when human geography was 
itself determining its content and reach, its own epistemic boundaries. This is as true of 
Poland, Yugoslavia, and Romania as it is of Britain and the United States.  
     John McFarlane likewise turned to the new post-war Europe in his address as president of 
section E on 24 August 1920 to the BAAS meeting in Cardiff (McFarlane, 1920). While we 
cannot prove direct connections between Newbigin and Ogilvie before 1922 sufficient to 
suggest that Newbigin drew upon Ogilvie’s Paris experiences for her 1918 paper and 1920 
book, McFarlane certainly heard Ogilvie speak upon the issue. Ogilvie stood down from his 
Paris peace work in June 1919 to join the University of Manchester. During his brief tenure 
of the lectureship in geography there, Ogilvie addressed an ‘audience of about 40’ at the 
Manchester Geographical Society, on 5 November 1919, on ‘Geography at [the] Peace 
Conference’ (Ogilvie, E., Diaries, 5 November 1919). It is impossible to know whether 
McFarlane drew from Ogilvie’s 1919 speech for his Cardiff lecture and paper, or upon 
Newbigin’s 1920 work, but the cumulative evidence of presidential BAAS addresses, 
published papers and public speeches nonetheless indicates the strength of interest in post-
War Europe, Hungary included.  
     McFarlane’s argument was clear: ‘In the rearrangement of European States which has 
taken place, geographical conditions have perhaps not had the consideration which they 
deserve’ (McFarlane, 1920, p. 217). These conditions were not those advocated by Holdich – 
natural ‘defensive frontiers’ (McFarlane, 1920, p. 218) – but, rather, the principle of self-
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determination: a central tenet of Wilson’s plan for the new Europe (MacMillan, 2001; Tooze, 
2014; Seegel, 2018; Bowman, 1922). In McFarlane’s view, these were overlooked in the final 
boundary mapping on ethnic grounds. Because this principle had been unevenly applied 
rather than wholly ignored, argued McFarlane, ‘we shall, I think, find that the promise of 
stability is greatest in those cases where geographical and ethnical conditions are most in 
harmony, and least where undue weight has been given to conditions which are neither 
geographical nor ethnical’ (McFarlane, 1920, p. 218). Poland was now ‘geographically 
weak’; Czechoslovakia ‘in various ways the most interesting country in the reconstructed 
Europe’ (McFarlane, 1920, pp. 221, 224). Hungary – specifically, the effect upon the ‘great 
natural region’ of the Hungarian plain, and ‘the mountain region which surrounds it’ 
(McFarlane, 1920, p. 227) – was the subject of particular comment: ‘[I]t is in the treatment of 
the Hungarian plain that we feel most disposed to criticise the territorial settlements of the 
Peace Treaties. Geographical principles have been violated by the dismemberment of a 
region in which the Magyars were in a majority, and in which they were steadily improving 
their position’. ‘The position as a whole’, McFarlane stressed, ‘is one of unstable equilibrium. 
. . . In this part of Europe at least a League of Nations will not have to seek for its troubles’ 
(McFarlane, 1920, p.p. 227–28). 
     The views expressed within the BAAS about the ‘dismemberment’ of Hungary and the 
new post-War Europe in the years immediately following the conflict, both in the wake of the 
Armistice (Anon., 1918) and following Trianon (Lyde, 1921; McFarlane, 1920), are 
consistent with themes identified elsewhere and in earlier years: competing notions of 
boundary work; recognition of the ethnic basis to Europe’s new boundaries but, importantly, 
no consistency of agreement on either the accuracy of their positioning or their longer-term 
consequences. If, as McFarlane observed, ‘A great experiment has been made in the new 
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settlement of Europe’ (McFarlane, 1920, p. 232), it was not one in which he and others felt 




This paper has shown the central and complex role played by geography and individual 
geographers in drawing boundaries for a once modern Europe. This study of geographers’ 
involvement with the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, of geographies made in particular ways (ethnic 
mapping), and in specific settings (Parisian hotels, the RGS, BAAS meetings), speaks also to 
matters of wider significance. These include the importance of critical and contextual 
biographical work in the histories of geographical knowledge (Barnes, 2001). This paper has 
centred upon Ogilvie’s unpublished work, but others closely involved in drafting the new 
Europe have left personal and published reflections of their role (Lansing, 1921; Bowman, 
1922; Nicholson, 1933; Temperley, 1920; Cholnoky, 1942). The role of powerful individuals 
and of international connections in helping shape the discipline in the early twentieth century 
and in different national contexts (Smith, 2003; Seegel, 2018) is also relevant. So is the role 
of the BAAS in providing space for the articulation of geographical debate in a period of 
disciplinary formation (Withers, 2010a), and geographers’ involvement as quasi-state-
mapping agents in helping re-cast Europe’s borders in the wake of conflict (Bowman, 1922; 
Dhand, 2018; Seegel, 2018). 
     The paper has highlighted how boundaries, lines on maps, and the treaties that determine 
them, can mean different things to different people. To Hungarians and Hungarian 
geographers, then and now, Hungary’s ‘dismemberment’ following Trianon represented a 
particular, perhaps extreme, consequence of Europe’s geographers doing the work of peace. 
Britain’s geographers were centrally involved in this boundary work, Alan Ogilvie most 
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centrally of all. As this paper has shown, his work and that of others’, should be understood 
not as the straightforward working-out of agreed political and geographical principles – ‘basal 
points’ as Ogilvie put it in 1922 – but of personal connections in Paris and in London and the 
articulation there of different views as to what a boundary was, and how it should be arrived 
at.      
     For Arthur Hinks and for Alan Ogilvie, British geographical expertise during WWI was 
not helped by the uneven qualities of the several geographical and mapping sections of the 
British government. British geographers had turned their attention to the complexities of 
Hungary’s delimitation on ethnic grounds as early as 1915. But where, in London, Wallis and 
Hinks considered ethnicity the basis to Hungary’s delimitation, as Ogilvie and the GSGS 
party would on Britain’s behalf in Paris from February 1919, others in the RGS held to 
different emphases: Lyde to rivers, Holdich to physiography. In London, there was no single 
British view over how boundaries should be derived or how to delimit Hungary.  
     In Paris, things were different. The day-to-day work of defining Europe’s borders and 
reporting to the Central Geographical Committee upon the activities of numerous boundary 
activities was, ostensibly, rooted in matters of principle: national self-determination and 
delimitation of the new Europe on ethnic grounds. As Ogilvie made clear in 1922, and as he 
directly experienced between February and May 1919, principles were not adhered to, partly 
because they conflicted one with another (railways and communication and economic 
circumstances with ethnic divisions, for example) and because the principal delimiting basis, 
ethnicity on the basis of language, could not be applied uniformly without, in the Hungarian 
context, leaving large numbers of ethnic Hungarians outside Hungary’s post-Trianon borders. 
Ogilvie’s work on boundaries did not cease with his leaving the GSGS, as his November 
1919 talk in Manchester shows. Evelyn Ogilvie noted that her husband was ‘at work on 
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frontiers’ for Temperley in June 1920, even as they were both settling in to New York 
(Ogilvie, E., Diaries, 19 June 1920).  
     In illuminating geographers doing peace work after WWI, the paper extends Heffernan’s 
insights into their war work before 1918 and helps explain, given Ogilvie’s observations, the 
relative weaknesses of British geography and the uneven institutional provision in mapping. 
Rather, however, than see this as a symptom of the ‘largely amateur status’ of British 
geography at this time (Heffernan, 1996, p. 521), our research has pointed to more complex 
circumstances: competing views over boundaries, disagreements over maps, a shortage of 
maps, and a failure to work to the political principles agreed upon. At a time when members 
of the RGS subscribed to different views over national borders, the meetings of the BAAS 
provided a forum for the public presentation of these issues, and, in the work of MacFarlane 
(1920) and Lyde (1921), the chance to speak to pressing concerns about the reconstruction of 
Europe after 1918. Trianon was dramatic but not unique. As Holdich recognised, whatever 
the means chosen to delimit the new Europe, things would not be the same again: ‘There is 
probably not a nationality between Central Europe and Persia which will occupy exactly the 
same place after the war as it did before’ (Holdich, 1918, p. ix). Bowman expressed similar 
views: ‘The effects of the Great War are so far-reaching that we shall have henceforth a new 
world’ (Bowman, 1922, 1). Both men were right. 
     Years after his involvement in Paris, Ogilvie reflected upon boundaries and his boundary 
work in his inaugural lecture to the University of Edinburgh, admitting that ‘The new 
frontiers of Europe are clearly far from perfect’ (Ogilvie, 1924, p. 74). ‘We all know’, 
Ogilvie continued, ‘that these new frontiers were not fixed in the calm atmosphere of peace, 
but when the political air was still whirling round the deepest storm-centre of history’ 
(Ogilvie, 1924, p. 74). Yet it was necessary that geography should ‘enter very largely into the 
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business of boundary making’ since, as he saw it, modern geography was both a study and an 
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Figure 1. O. Légrády, ‘Territorial provisions of the peace treaty of Trianon’, in Justice for 
Hungary! The Cruel Errors of Trianon (Budapest, 1930), p. 6.  
 
Figure 2. Pal Teleki, Ethnographical Map of Hungary Based on Density of Population; 
Magyaroszág néprajzi térképe a népsürüség alapján; Carte ethnographique de la Hongrie 
construite en accordance avec la densitè [sic] de la population (Budapest, 1919).  
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